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Do private firms exhibit opportunistic earnings management behaviour and to what extent, 
if any, does the earnings management behaviour of private firms vary with the degree of 
managerial ownership? These questions have real economic consequences. Firms may mis-
direct productive resources by altering their operations to manage earnings. Alternatively, 
varying accounting practice can distort reported firm performance, constrain market 
transparency and accumulate problems by shifting earnings through time. Examining these 
concerns in the context of private firms is pressing in light of private firms’ role in the 
economy1, uncertain agency costs incurred by private firms (Ang et al. 2000, Fleming et al. 
2005) and the sparse empirical literature examining earnings management within private 
rather than public firms.  
 
This study addresses these research questions by examining how earnings management, 
measured as discretionary accruals, varies with the shareholdings of the Managing Director 
(hereafter MD). We report two major findings. One, private firms exhibit opportunistic 
earnings management behaviour. Firms with low managerial ownership engage in more 
earnings management when faced with poor performance compared to firms with 
intermediate or high levels of managerial ownership. Two, the earnings management 
behaviour of private firms varies with managerial ownership when firms report income-
increasing discretionary accruals and not otherwise. This relationship takes a non-linear U-
shaped pattern whereby discretionary accruals are lowest in firms when the MD owns 
approximately 44% of the equity in the firm.  
This study makes two contributions to the earnings management literature. First, it extends 
the empirical work of Ball and Shivakumar (2005), Burgstahler et al. (2006) and others 
documenting the magnitude of earnings management in private firms. This is achieved 
through exploring how discretionary accrual use varies with managerial ownership in private 
firms. Second, we examine whether the earnings management behaviours documented in 
poorly performing public firms are also observed in private firms (Chung et al. 2002, Givoly 
et al. 2010, Hope et al. 2013, Peasnell et al. 2005). As the results of previous studies 
undertaken, for example within the USA, have little generalisability to other nations (Givoly 
                                                          
1 Brav (2009) estimates that 60% of corporate assets in the UK are owned by private firms. 
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et al. 2010) it is also important to examine these concerns in a UK regulatory environment. 
Further, we report concentrated ownership, prevalent in private firms, does not appear to 
function as an effective monitoring mechanism in preventing these behaviours.   
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature 
and presents hypotheses. In section 3 the sample and variables are described and the 
empirical method is outlined. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics for earnings 
management, ownership and other variables used in the study. This section also reports the 
regression estimates, which establish the relationship between managerial ownership and 
earnings management and tests whether earnings management in a sub-sample of firms is 
driven by managerial opportunism. A discussion of these results and conclusions are 
provided in section 5. 
 
2.  Literature review and hypothesis development   
2.1  Literature and Hypotheses 
Earnings management, the “… use of managerial discretion over (within GAAP) accounting 
choices, earnings reporting choices, and real economic decisions to influence how 
underlying economic events are reflected in one or more measures of earnings” (p. 446, 
Walker, 2013) is a critical theme within accounting research. Academic literature examining 
this concern has developed from claims that earnings might be manipulated to signal private 
information about expected future cash-flows to shareholders or influence third parties such 
as creditors, suppliers and employees (see Lintner 1956). This process of earnings 
management has been reported to have real cash-flow effects for different firm stakeholders 
and is associated with self-serving behaviour by managers, shareholders and other firm 
actors.  
This literature was re-focused after Healy’s (1985) seminal study which reported US 
managers manipulate earnings to satisfy bonus targets and enhance their compensation. The 
literature has been advanced by re-testing and extending Healy’s central thesis that managers 
manipulate earnings to maximise their remuneration, providing evidence of earnings 
management to maximise managerial compensation internationally (Walker 2013). 
Developments in this literature have included retesting this proposition internationally, for 
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different company forms and in distinct institutional settings, through examining (1) the 
mechanisms by which earnings are opportunistically managed to maximise managerial 
compensation; (2) how managerial ownership of firms may limit the managerial misuse of 
earnings management and (3) the linear or non-linear form of this relationship. These studies 
have focused, nearly exclusively, on discretionary accruals as an accounting measure open 
to manipulation (Cohen and Zarowin 2010).  
Opportunistic earnings management is exercised in both good and poor years whereby 
earnings are raised or reduced, to achieve certain bonus thresholds or not to exceed these, 
enabling a CEO to appreciate the benefits of good corporate performance over multiple years 
(Holthausen et al. 1995). This is important if managers’ compensation or continued 
employment is sensitive to firms’ accounting performance and managers have the ability, 
through discretion over the magnitude of accruals, to change the reported accounting 
performance of the firm. As accruals reverse over time there are also incentives for managers 
to “bank” good performance for future reporting by managing earnings downwards if they 
exceed the point which makes dismissal unlikely or a point which maximises compensation 
or another contractual or informal benchmark. For example, Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006) report that the magnitude of discretionary accruals is greater at firms where the 
CEO’s compensation is more sensitive to share price performance and that CEOs exercise 
unusually high amounts of share options in years where accruals are very high.  
If opportunistic earnings management is motivated by managers’ efforts to increase their 
proportion of firm cash-flows at the expense of shareholders, the incentives driving this 
behaviour may be inversely related to managerial ownership. It is expected that MDs who 
own relatively little (or no) equity have distinct opportunistic incentives to mask poor firm 
performance, since they are more vulnerable to dismissal by shareholders. MDs who own a 
high percentage (or all) of the firm’s equity do not have such incentives. Therefore a 
significant difference is expected in the earnings management behaviour of firms with low 
and high equity owning MDs, when faced with poor firm performance. This interpretation 
was originally supported in the literature (Warfield et al. 1995, Gul et al.2003). Employing 
a meta-analysis of corporate governance and earnings management, Garcia-Meca and 
Sanchez-Ballesta (2009), likewise, concluded that higher board ownership is associated with 
lower discretionary accruals. This said, consensus on this question has not emerged, with 
several authors documenting insignificant linear relationships between managerial 
ownership and earnings management (e.g. Klein 2002, Koh 2003).  
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This impasse has been addressed by re-examining the relationship between managerial 
ownership and earnings management and relaxing the assumption that this relationship is 
linear. A non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management 
may arise from different influences. Initially, while increasing managerial ownership may 
align the incentives of managers with shareholders, once managerial ownership crosses a 
threshold, managers may become entrenched (Short and Keasey 1999). This implies outside 
shareholders have a diminished ability to effectively monitor managers and discipline non-
value maximising behaviour (Morck et al. 1988). Earnings management, by allowing the 
manager to disguise the underlying economic performance of the firm, may be associated 
with this behaviour. This entrenchment argument implies that discretionary accruals may be 
an increasing function of managerial ownership once it crosses a certain threshold.  
Evidence of non-linear relationships between earnings management and various aspects of 
ownership structure and managerial pay has emerged for public firms, internationally. For 
example a U-shaped relationship between insider ownership and the informativeness of 
earnings has been observed for East Asian (Fan and Wong 2002) and Singaporean (Yeo et 
al. 2002) firms. Kahn and Mather (2013) also find evidence of a U-shape relationship 
between earnings quality and managerial ownership for Australian public companies and 
report that this is driven by income increasing accruals.  Despite the scope and dynamism of 
this literature, equivalent examinations of private firms have been limited in their number.  
The incentives facing managers in private firms, and their opportunity to disguise true 
economic performance through discretionary accruals, may differ systematically from the 
situation in public firms. The highly concentrated ownership and high degree of insider 
ownership predominant in private firms (Brav 2009) and the prevalence of long term 
relationships between private firms and creditors (Vera and Onji 2010) suggest that the role 
of financial statements in reducing information asymmetries between management and 
shareholders and between firms and creditors may be less important than in the case in public 
firms (Peek 2010). Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Burgstahler et al. (2006) report 
significantly lower earnings quality in UK and European private firms respectively 
compared to public firms and attribute these findings to differing demands of shareholders 
and creditors for accounting information in public and private firms. This reduced demand 
for high quality accounting information by stakeholders may be associated with an increased 
influence of incentives to manage earnings in private firms. As well as the opportunistic 
incentive, discussed earlier, private firms may manage earnings to improve the terms of trade 
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available from suppliers and customers, to avoid breaching debt covenants or to minimise 
taxation liabilities . 
We hypothesise that the opportunistic incentive to manage earnings2 implies that 
discretionary accruals in private firms will be related to managerial ownership. This 
relationship may be linear or non-linear, there are plausible arguments to support either of 
these forms and there is empirical evidence indicating a linear and non-linear form of the  
relationship in public firms. We therefore posit two hypotheses on the relationship between 
managerial ownership and discretionary accruals.  
 
H1a  Discretionary accruals are negatively related to managerial equity ownership. 
H1b  Discretionary accruals and managerial ownership exhibit a U-shaped relationship. 
As managerial ownership increases, discretionary accruals first decline and then increase.  
 
We examine the interaction between poor firm performance, managerial ownership and 
discretionary accruals. For this analysis, we focus on the sample of income-increasing 
discretionary accrual firms only. Engaging in earnings management in the context of poor 
firm performance does not necessarily indicate managerial opportunism. This behaviour in 
private firms may be motivated by factors consistent with interests of shareholders, such as 
minimising taxation liabilities (Karjalainen 2015). Our second hypothesis arises from the 
opportunistic incentives of MDs who own low shareholdings to manage earnings upwards 
when firm performance is poor.  Kahn and Mahler (2013), examining public firms, report a 
quadratic relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management however 
there is little extant evidence on whether such a relationship exists for private firms. The 
tenure of managers with a low (or no) shareholding may be contingent on accounting 
performance. Existing evidence also suggests that the relation between managerial 
compensation and accounting performance in private firms is significantly stronger where 
                                                          
2 In the subsequent analysis we assume discretionary accruals are the focus of earnings management. We 
acknowledge that earning manipulation can emerge through real activities such as discretionary firm spending 





managers own a low equity shareholding (Michiels et al. 2013), providing a further possible 
incentives for managers owning a low shareholding to manage earnings.  
We posit that a poorly performing firm is incentivised to increase reported earnings using 
income-increasing accruals if its MD has a low shareholding. Conversely, an MD with a 
high shareholding has less incentive to disguise poor firm performance through earnings 
management. 
H2  Firms with an MD owning a low shareholding will exhibit a higher degree of income-
increasing earnings management compared with firms managed by MDs owning an 
intermediate or high shareholding, when firm performance is poor. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Method 
This section describes the dataset, the sample selection procedures, variable construction 
and the empirical approach used to test the hypotheses.  
 
3.1  Data, Sample and Variables  
The research questions are addressed using a sample of 1,223 private UK firms. The sample 
is limited to firms classified as large by Companies House, as smaller private firms are 
exempt from returning complete accounts. Data is collected from the BvD FAME database, 
which is compiled from Annual Returns and Company Accounts filed with Companies 
House. Ownership data is from the Annual Return submitted in 2013 and financial and other 
variables are from the Annual Returns submitted in 2013 and 2014. To construct the 
managerial ownership variables, the identity of the MD is ascertained from Company 
Accounts and manually matched to the shareholder data. The fundamental measure of 
managerial ownership used in the study is the percentage of equity owned by the MD. 
Further variables are constructed from this to capture high and low levels of managerial 
ownership (variables defined in Table 1). 
While prior empirical research on accruals based earnings management has adopted a variety 
of measures, we adopt absolute value discretionary accruals as the measure of earnings 
management. The most common approach is to assume that a firm’s total accruals comprise 
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non-discretionary and discretionary elements, with the former depending on the business 
activities of the firm and the latter arising from accounting choices or earnings management. 
Non-discretionary, or ‘normal’ accruals, are most commonly estimated using one of several 
alternative specifications of the modified Jones Model (Walker 2013), where subtracting the 
non-discretionary accruals from the firm’s total accruals yields an estimate of discretionary 
accruals. When estimating the modified Jones Model, we (1) include an intercept (Kothari 
et al. 2005); (2) adjust change in sales for the change in receivables to account for managerial 
discretion in the recognition of credit sales (Deschow et al. 1995); and (3) use a cross 
sectional industry based sample (Bartov et al. 2000). Total accruals are calculated on a 
balance sheet basis. For firm i in year t: 
TAC𝑖𝑡 = (∆CA 𝑖𝑡 −  ∆Cash  𝑖𝑡) − (∆CL 𝑖𝑡 −  ∆STD𝑖𝑡 −  ∆TP𝑖𝑡) −  DEP𝑖𝑡 (1) 
Where for firm i at time t, TAC is total accruals, ∆CA is Change in Current Assets from year 
t-1 to year t, ∆Cash is Change in Cash from year t-1 to year t, ∆CL is Change in Current 
Liabilities from year t-1 to year t, ∆STD is Change in Short Term Debt and current portion 
of Long Term Debt included in Current Liabilities from year t-1 to year t, ∆TP is Change in 
Taxes Payable  included in Current Liabilities from year t-1 to year t and DEP is 
Depreciation and Amortisation charge for year t. 
The relationship between total accruals, discretionary accruals and non-discretionary 
accruals is:  
TAC𝑖𝑡 =  𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡          (2) 
Where for firm i at time t, TAC is total accruals calculated using equation 1, NDAC is Non-
discretionary accruals and DAC is discretionary accruals calculated by subtracting NDAC 
from TAC. The modified Jones model used to estimate NDAC, employs the following OLS 
regression for each group of sample firms in a 2 digit SIC industry sector3, in which there 
are at least 10 firms: 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 +  𝛽1 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +  𝛽2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡− ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (3) 
DAC for firm i in year t, scaled by lagged total assets, is: 
                                                          
3 We amend the sample to provide at least 10 observations per 2-digit SIC code. This results in a reduction of 








) − (?̂? +   ?̂?1 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +  ?̂?2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡− ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +  𝛽3̂ (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
))   (4) 
where ?̂? and ?̂? are the estimated coefficients from equation 3, TA is Total Assets, ∆REV is 
Change in Revenue from year t-1 to year t, ∆REC is Change in Receivables from year t-1 to 
year t, PPE is Gross Property, Plant and Equipment  and all other variables are as defined 
previously. It is assumed positive discretionary accruals arise from income-decreasing 
earnings management and negative discretionary accruals result from income-increasing 
earnings management by firms.  
As firms may engage in earnings management to avoid reporting a fall in earnings we 
examine firms’ incentives to manage earnings upwards. While pre-managed earnings are 
generally employed for this purpose and computed by reversing the effect of estimated 
discretionary accruals on reported profit (Cornett et al. 2008) this approach can result in 
spurious correlations (DeFond and Park 1997, Peasnell et al. 2005). We therefore follow the 
approach of Peasnell et al. (2005) and use thresholds based on the Cash Flow from Operating 
Activities (CF) rather than pre-managed earnings. Specifically, two dummy variables are 
used to reflect managers’ incentives to manage earnings upwards: CF Fall, which takes the 
value of one where CF0 < CF-1 and zero otherwise, and CF Loss where CF0 < 0 and zero 
otherwise. Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms anticipating either a loss (proxied by CF Loss) 
or a fall in reported earnings (proxied by CF Fall) engage in income-increasing earnings 
management through negative accruals. Here we question whether the incentives to do so 
differ with the degree of MD equity ownership.  
Leverage, industry, firm size, growth, firm age and the presence of a non-managing, majority 
shareholder are included in the regressions as control variables.  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
3.2  Empirical Method 
Two hypotheses are tested using a number of regression models. Reflecting the cross-
sectional dataset an OLS estimator is employed throughout. First, we test whether the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals varies either linearly or non-linearly with the percentage 
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ownership of the MD. This is tested by regressing discretionary accruals on the percentage 
ownership of the MD and its quadratic term; this is shown in Equations 5 and 6 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖 =  𝜕 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐷 %𝑖 + + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖      (5) 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖 =  𝜕 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐷 %𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐷 %𝑖
2 +  𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖           (6)  
We first estimate equation 5, which includes a linear MD % term to determine whether 
discretionary accruals are a linear function of managerial ownership. We then estimate 
equation 6, including the quadratic term MD % 2. We predict a negative 1 when the 
quadratic ownership term is excluded, and a negative coefficient on 1 and a positive 
coefficient on 2, when the quadratic term in included, indicating support for a non-linear 
relationship in that the magnitude of discretionary accruals falls then rises as managerial 
ownership increases. As results of White’s tests (White 1980) indicating heteroskedacity, 
robust (Huber-White) standard errors are reported. 
The second hypothesis examines if firms managed by an MD owning a low percentage of 
equity will engage in greater income-increasing earnings management when firm 
performance is poor. This question is based on the expectation that MDs have conservative 
and opportunistic incentives to increase earnings when they descend below particular 
thresholds. These incentives may vary inversely with the shareholding of the MD and arise 
due to contractual relationships with their employer which relate, either explicitly or 
implicitly, to outcomes such as compensation and tenure to reported financial performance. 
To test this question we estimate four models including interactions between variables 
measuring managerial ownership and variables measuring poor firm performance. These 
models are estimated on the income-increasing sample only.  Equations 7 to 10 include 
combinations of two managerial ownership variables (MD High and MD Low) and two firm 
performance variables (CF Loss and CF Fall).  
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖 =  𝜕 +  𝛽1𝑀𝐷 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐷 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐹 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖 +  𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖      (7) 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖 =  𝜕 +  𝛽1𝑀𝐷 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐷 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐹 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖   (8) 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖 =  𝜕 +  𝛽1𝑀𝐷 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹 𝐹𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐷 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐹 𝐹𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖    (9) 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖 =  𝜕 +  𝛽1𝑀𝐷 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹 𝐹𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐷 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐹 𝐹𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖 +  𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (10) 
The main variables of interest are the interaction terms (β3) which indicate if the percentage 
of MD shareholding moderates the relationship between a cash flow loss/fall and the use of 
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income-increasing earnings management. A positive coefficient is predicted for β3 in 
equation 7, indicating that firms with a low MD’s share ownership, engage in more earnings 
management when firm performance is poor (i.e. when CF Loss = 1). Equation 8 is similar 
to Equation 7 but includes MD High, rather than MD Low, in which the MD’s share 
ownership is more than one standard deviation greater than the sample mean. A negative 
coefficient is predicted for β3 in equation 8. We replicate equations 7 and 8, but include CF 
Fall, rather than CF Loss, as a measure of poor firm performance, as detailed in equations 9 
and 10; the predictions for the coefficients are the same as those in equations 7 and 8.  
 
4.  Results 
The descriptive statistics and results of the regression models are outlined in this section. 
Summary statistics for the full sample, the sample of firms reporting income-increasing DAC 
and the sample of firms reporting income-decreasing DAC are presented in Table 2. The 
characteristics of the subsamples are compared in Table 3 and Table 4 provides correlation 
statistics. The results of multivariate regressions considering hypothesis 1 are reported in 
Table 5 (equations 5 and 6). For the second hypothesis, estimates from equations 7 to 10 are 
provided in Table 6. Lastly, diagnostic and sensitivity tests are reported.  
 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics.  
The analysis of the relationship between discretionary accruals and managerial ownership 
examines the full sample and the income-increasing discretionary accruals sample and 
income-decreasing discretionary accruals samples separately for hypothesis 1, and the 
income-increasing discretionary accruals sample only for hypothesis 2. To determine 
whether there are significant differences between the characteristics of these samples we 
report summary statistics for each sample separately and parametric and non-parametric test 
statistics are provided comparing the income-increasing and income-decreasing samples. 
These statistics are provided in Tables 2 and 3.4 
                                                          
4 Firms are assigned to the Income-increasing and Income-decreasing discretionary accruals samples based on 
the sign of the discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones model. For the AWCA measure, 
the number of firms assigned to the Income-increasing and Income-decreasing samples is based on the sign of 
the abnormal working capital accruals estimated using the Defond and Park (2001) model.  
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Table 3 shows a comparison between the income-increasing and income-decreasing 
samples. The difference between the absolute means of the income-increasing and income-
decreasing DAC is not statistically significant. Statistically significant differences between 
the samples are evident with the income-increasing DAC sample having lower ROA, Age, 
and Growth and higher Leverage and CF than the income-decreasing discretionary accruals 
sample. There are no significant differences between the samples in respect of firm size or 
managerial ownership.  
As shown in Table 2, the three managerial ownership variables indicate a high level of share 
ownership by MDs. In the full sample, the mean shareholding of the MD (MD %) is 44.2% 
but with a significant minority (22.8%) of firms managed by an outsider or low shareholding 
MDs (owning less than 9.96% of equity in the firm).  MD High and MD Low represent the 
extremes of insider ownership in the sample.  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Pearson correlation coefficients for the full sample are presented in Table 4. DAC is 
positively correlated with AWCA, ROA and Growth and measures of managerial ownership, 
MD % and MD High. DAC is also positively related to the measures of poor firm 
performance, CF Loss and CF Fall, which indicate current year cash-flow from operations 
is negative and lower than the previous year, respectively. Big 4, ln Age and Leverage are 
negatively correlated with DAC. The three variables measuring MD ownership, MD %, MD 
Low and MD High, are highly correlated as each variable is measuring an aspect of the same 
underlying characteristic. As only one variable appears in any model this result will not give 
rise to multicollinearity. The correlation coefficients between ROA and several other firm 
characteristics, ln Turnover, Leverage and Growth, CF Loss and CF Fall are all significant. 
Leverage is correlated with firm age, Growth and Big 4. The mean (maximum) VIFs for 
each regression model estimated ranges from is 1.10 to 1.23 (1.26 to 2.30) and indicate that 
multicollinearity is not a significant concern in this data.  




Figure 1 shows absolute discretionary accruals (scaled by lagged total assets) by MD 
percentage equity ownership quartile in the sample firms and a U-shape, at this preliminary 
stage, is apparent. DAC are highest in firms in the top quartile of MD ownership, at 8%. 
DAC declines to 6.8% in firms where MD ownership is between 12.5% and 40.5% and is 
higher (7.3%) for the bottom quartile of firms by MD ownership.    
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
4.2  Regression Results 
Table 5 provides the results of regressions testing for linear and non-linear relationships 
between DAC and managerial ownership for the full sample, the income-increasing sample 
and the income-decreasing sample. Hypothesis 1a predicts a negative sign for the coefficient 
MD % in equation 5, however, the coefficient on MD % is not significantly different from 
zero in the full sample or the subsamples, suggesting there is little evidence of a linear, 
negative relationship. This is contrary to Gabrielson et al. (2002) who report a linear 
relationship albeit between information content, rather than discretionary accruals, and 
managerial ownership. 
 
Hypothesis 1b predicts a negative coefficient for MD % and a positive coefficient for MD 
%2 which would provide evidence of a U-shaped relationship.  The signs on the coefficients 
are as predicted, and statistically significant, but only for the income-increasing 
discretionary accruals sample. This suggests that discretionary accruals fall and then rise as 
managerial ownership rises. The coefficients on the MD % and MD %2, for the income-
increasing sample, indicate that the lowest discretionary accruals are used by firms with 
43.96% MD ownership. 
 
This differs to Yeo et al. (2002) who find a U-shape relationship for public firms but do not 
distinguish between income-increasing and income-decreasing accruals as they measure 
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informativeness of earnings.  These results, do, however, support Kahn and Mather (2013), 
who emphasise the importance of considering income-decreasing and income-increasing 
accruals separately for their analysis of public firms. 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
Several of the control variables are also significantly different from zero in the models. 
Growth is positively related to DAC in each sample suggesting additional discretionary 
accruals are more prevalent for growth firms. Leverage is negatively related to DAC, 
although this relationship is not significant in the income-increasing sample. Big 4 auditor 
status is negatively related to DAC only in the income-decreasing sample suggesting such 
accruals are lower when a Big 4 auditor is employed.  Firm age is negatively related to DAC, 
older firms appear to use less discretionary accruals and this relationship is significant in 
each sample. ROA is negatively related to DAC in the income-increasing sub-sample and 
positively related to DAC in the income-decreasing sub-sample, providing support for the 
use of DAC to increase profitability for poor performing firms.  Monitoring by an outside 
majority shareholder, as measured by the variable Outside 50, does not appear to influence 
the use of discretionary accruals5. 
Insert Table 6 here 
Table 6 presents the results of regressions including the interaction terms between CF Loss 
and CF Fall and managerial ownership which are used to test the second hypothesis.  For 
clarity, given that we predict only firms with poor performance will wish to enhance their 
accounting earnings, we limit our presentation of the results to the income-increasing sample 
only6.  
There appears to be a greater use of income-increasing accruals when managerial ownership 
is low and cash flow is negative, as evidenced by the significantly positive  coefficient for 
                                                          
5 For each regression that includes Outside 50, we repeat the analysis with dummy variables indicating the 
presence of a single outside shareholder with 60%, 70% and 80% ownership. In each case the coefficient is 
not significantly different from zero. 
6 The analysis was repeated on the income-decreasing sample and there was no evidence of a significant 
interaction between managerial ownership and poor firm performance. Results of this analysis are available 
from the authors on request.  
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the dummy variable MD Low*CF Loss.  These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2, 
which predicts that firms managed by MDs owning less than 9.96% of equity (MD Low = 
1)  manage earnings upwards in response to poor firm performance to a greater degree than 
firms owned by MD’s with equity ownership greater than 9.96%. These findings suggest 
that managers in these firms are motivated to disguise firm poor performance. This 
conjecture is supported by the insignificant coefficient for the pertinent variables in equation 
8.    
The second measure of poor firm performance used is a decline in Cash-Flow from 
Operations. The interpretation of the results is similar to that of equations 7 and 8, although 
the magnitudes of the coefficients of interest are lower. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the 
coefficient on MD Low * CF Fall, is positive and significant. This provides further evidence 
of opportunistic earnings management by MDs who own low or no equity. The MD 
High*CF Loss coefficient is not significantly different from zero suggesting MDs do not 
tend to use discretionary accruals to improve earnings when a negative cash flow is indicated 
when they have high ownership.   
We perform a number of additional tests to confirm that the results are robust to the 
exclusion of outliers and influential observations. Each model is re-estimated using 
unwinsorised variables. In each case the sign, magnitude and significance of coefficients is 
very similar to that reported here.  
Fan (2007), Ball and Shivakumar (2008) and Gounopoulos and Pham (2016) suggest firms 
engage in income-increasing accruals prior to an initial public offering.  Only two firms in 
our sample completed an IPO within a year of our observations. The analysis was repeated 
excluding these firms. The results are identical to those presented earlier.  
 
4.3 Alternative measure of discretionary accruals 
As a robustness check, we employ an alternative measure to proxy for earnings management. 
We repeat the analysis described above using abnormal working capital accruals estimated 
using the Defond and Parks (2001) method. This approach models a firm’s expected working 
capital accruals in the current year using the ratio of its prior years ratio of working capital 
accruals to sales.  
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AWCA𝑖𝑡 =  𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡 − [(
𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑡−1
) ∗ 𝑆𝑡]                                               (14) 
where for firm i at time t, AWCA is abnormal working capital accruals, WC is non-cash 
working capital and S is sales.  
The sign of the AWCA is used to partition observations into income-increasing and income-
decreasing samples. The absolute AWCAs are scaled by lagged Total Assets and winsorised 
at the 1st and 99th percentile. Summary statistics for the AWCAs are provided in Table 27.   
Table 7 presents the results of re-estimating regressions (5) to (10) with abnormal working 
capital accruals included as the dependant variable. The results of the analysis, employing 
AWCAs as a proxy for earnings management, provide limited support for our main findings. 
AWCAs are positively related to MD ownership in the full sample only. The signs on the 
MD and MD2 coefficients in the income-increasing sample are the same as in Table 5 but 
the MD coefficient is not significantly different from zero.  
Table 8 reports evidence on the interaction between poor firm performance, managerial 
ownership and AWCAs. The key variables of interest are the interaction terms between 
MD High or Low and CF Fall or Loss. Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative and significant 
coefficient on MD Low * CF Loss and MD Low * CF Fall. In both cases the coefficients 
are negative but not significantly different from zero. These results provide limited support 
for Hypothesis 2.  
 
5  Discussion and Conclusions 
Public and private firms face different demands from shareholders and creditors for 
accounting information and these distinct demand environments are associated with lower 
earnings quality in private firms compared to public firms. There is an extensive literature 
on the relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management in public firms 
but this question has received little empirical attention in the context of private firms. It is 
not obvious that empirical findings in public firms will generalise to private firms. 
                                                          
7 Seven sample firms are missing a variable required to estimate AWCA using Equation 14. These firms are 
excluded from this robustness test, leaving a sample of 1,021. 
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Earnings management, through the use of discretionary accruals, does not, in itself, change 
the cash-flows of the firm. It does, however, affect the pattern and timing of reported 
earnings and if contractual outcomes for managers depend on reported profits then earnings 
management can alter the allocation of firm cash-flows between managers and shareholders. 
This suggests that managers may behave opportunistically to manage earnings. Incentives 
to divert firm resources from shareholders appear to only arise where managerial equity 
ownership falls below a certain level suggesting opportunistic concerns may prevail. This 
study examines whether discretionary accruals vary with managerial ownership and differs 
from the existing literature addressing this relationship through focussing on private firms, 
which differ systematically from public firms in the UK with respect to ownership structure. 
It also considers whether private firms with low managerial ownership manage earnings 
differently to firms with intermediate or high levels of managerial ownership when faced 
with poor firm performance.  
The results show that, considering both income-increasing discretionary accruals and 
income-decreasing discretionary accruals together, there is no statistically significant 
relationship with managerial ownership. Income-increasing discretionary accruals, 
considered in isolation, however, are related to managerial ownership in a U-shaped manner. 
Discretionary accruals fall and then rise as managerial ownership increases, with the 
relationship appearing to reverse direction where the MD owns 44% of equity in the firm. 
The results suggest that firms with both high and low levels of managerial ownership engage 
in more earnings management compared to firms with intermediate levels of managerial 
ownership. These results are robust when controlling for other firm characteristics that may 
be correlated with discretionary accruals. 
The second question addressed in this study is whether this observed earnings management 
behaviour is opportunistic. At high levels of managerial ownership it would seem unlikely 
that this behaviour is opportunistic in the sense of managers diverting firm resources as 
managers are in most cases the largest shareholder and often the only shareholder. Firms 
face a range of other incentives to manage earnings including influencing third parties such 
as trade creditors, lenders, suppliers and tax authorities. We hypothesise that opportunistic 
earnings management would be indicated if firms with low levels of MD ownership manage 
earnings upward to a greater extent when faced with poor firm performance than other firms. 
The results suggest that this is the case. Where managerial ownership is high (greater than 
78.48%) there is no significant interaction between poor firm performance and discretionary 
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accruals. Where managerial ownership is low (below 9.96%) discretionary accruals are 
higher when firm performance is poor. An implication of this result is that different factors 
drive earnings management behaviour where managerial ownership is high.  
Policy implications of this work suggest that non-managing shareholders in private firms 
face considerable agency costs, in particular where managerial ownership is very low or 
very high. Rational investors, anticipating the future impact of agency costs may choose not 
to invest in these firms or reduce the value placed on the firms’ to reflect the expected costs 
associated with agency conflicts. The finding that discretionary accruals are greater when 
managerial ownership is high may be particularly problematic for new shareholders who are 
less likely than existing shareholders to be integrated into the “insider access” model through 
which information flows from private firms to shareholders (Ball and Shivakumar 2005). 
As outside investors are more likely to be dependent on financial reports to monitor the firm, 
agency costs arising both from misalignment of incentives and managerial entrenchment, 
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